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Home > Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis

Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis

Article
Author/s: 
Giacomo Bonanno, Elias Tsakas
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher: 
Elsevier
Year: 
2018
Journal Article [1]
We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Börgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS.
Tags: 
Game Theory & Graphs [2]

Source URL:http://coalitiontheory.org/content/common-belief-weak-dominance-rationality-strategic-form-games-qualitative-analysis

Links
[1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825618301441#! [2] http://coalitiontheory.org/research-areas/game-theory-graphs