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Home > Stability of networks under level-k farsightedness

Stability of networks under level-k farsightedness

Working paper
Author/s: 
P.J.J. Herings, A. Mauleon, V. Vannetelbosch
Issue number: 
30.2014
Series: 
Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) Research Memorandum
Year: 
2014
PDF [1]
We provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability. A set of networks GK is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred. Second, from any network outside of GK there is a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length smaller than or equal to K leading to some network in GK. Third, there is no proper subset of GK satisfying the first two conditions.We show that a level-K farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a level-K farsightedly stable set. There is a unique level-1 farsightedly stable set G1 consisting of all networks that belong to closed cycles. Level-K farsighted stability leads to a refinement of G1 for generic allocation rules. We then provide easy to verify conditions for a set to be level-K farsightedly stable and we consider the relationship between level-K farsighted stability and efficiency of networks. We show the tractability of the concept by applying it to a model of criminal networks.
Tags: 
Bargaining Theory [2]
Game Theory & Graphs [3]
Social Choice [4]

Source URL:http://coalitiontheory.org/content/stability-networks-under-level-k-farsightedness

Links
[1] http://pub.maastrichtuniversity.nl/17a8d1b5-aca1-4303-96ac-d62bd9ab3fe2 [2] http://coalitiontheory.org/research-areas/bargaining-theory [3] http://coalitiontheory.org/research-areas/game-theory-graphs [4] http://coalitiontheory.org/research-areas/social-choice